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RETRIBUTIVISM, ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND AGENT CAUSALISM 
Christopher P. Taggart1
Except for limited forms of omissions liability, Anglo-American criminal law 
generally requires a criminal defendant, D, to perform a voluntary action before imposing 
criminal liability. Further, D must be morally responsible for performing the action for D 
to deserve punishment for doing it. So, a puzzle about moral responsibility connected to 
longstanding debates about determinism and free will, a puzzle that implies that D is never 
morally responsible for performing any action, must have a moral-responsibility-
preserving solution for any form of retributivism to be true. One compatibilist solution 
denies that moral responsibility requires what has been termed “ultimate responsibility.”
Whether ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility is a contested issue. 
And, if ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility, then the compatibilist 
solution is unavailable. This article argues that, if ultimate responsibility is required for 
moral responsibility, then, unless both indeterminism and agent causalism are true, any 
form of retributivism is false. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two longstanding sets of philosophical debates are significantly related. The first 
concerns how, if at all, retributivism is a defensible element of a theory of the justification 
of legal punishment. The second concerns how best to resolve various puzzles surrounding 
causal determinism and free will. A very broad question arises: What position should one 
take regarding one set of debates given the position one takes regarding the other set? This 
question delineates the general topic of this article. 
More specifically, this article argues that, on the assumption that a criminal 
???????????? ?????? ?????? ??????????????? ???? ??????????? ?? ?????? ????????? ???? ?ultimate 
responsibility? for committing that crime, any retributive theory of punishment is true only 
if both indeterminism and agent causalism are true. In other words, on the assumption that 
ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility: (1) If determinism is true, then 
no retributive theory of punishment is true; and, (2) if agent causalism is false, then no 
retributive theory of punishment is true, even if determinism is false. This paper, therefore, 
presents no arguments against retributivism backed by a compatibilist position that denies 
???? ?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????????????? ???? ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ?? ??? ????????
punishment for committing that crime.2
To defend its thesis, the article proceeds as follows. Part II explains ?retributive 
reasons? and argues that such facts must exist for any form of retributivism to be true. 
Section III presents a puzzle related to philosophical debates concerning determinism, free 
will, and the control that agents exercise when they perform voluntary actions. Part IV 
discusses ?ultimate? responsibility for doing something and explains why, if ?true? moral 
responsibility for an action requires ultimate responsibility for it, then determinism 
forecloses any retributivism-preserving solution to Part III??? ??????. Part V introduces 
agent causalism and argues that, even if determinism is false, agent causalism must be true 
for there to be a solution to Part III????????????????????????????????????????????retributivism. 
Part VI concludes by briefly recapitulating the main line of argument. 
II. RETRIBUTIVE REASONS
Retributive theories of punishment3 emphasize ?? ????????? ????????????? ????4
negative moral desert.5 The retributivist idea of moral desert is familiar: when D does 
                                                          
 2. Although I think that compatibilism is false, I offer no arguments for incompatibilism in this paper. 
 3. ????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????f punishment 
answer at least ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 2 (1968). If a punishment of D is justified, then it is morally permissible for the state to 
inflict that punishment upon D. This article ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to justify the severity of a punishment of D. P???????????????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ???????????
impermissible. 
 4. It is assumed throughout that D is a generally competent adult of at least average intelligence. 
 5. Sometimes, desert is not moral ???????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????ariety of strikingly different 
contexts. We might talk, for example, about one person who deserves a promotion, someone else who  
deserves a good grade, and some third person who deserves to win the race they are competing  
?????SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 4 (2012).???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a bad desert object, such as punishment, instead of a good one, such as praise. 
2
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something morally wrong, D deserves punishment for doing so, and the morally worse the 
wrongdoing, the more severe the punishment D deserves for doing it. Retributivism places 
?????????????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ?? ????
something that D has done. 
A retributive reason is a fact about what punishment, if any, D deserves for doing 
something.6 For example, if D is charged with an offense, C, that D did not commit, then 
D deserves no punishment for C. That D is innocent of C (and thus deserves no punishment 
for committing C) is a retributive reason not to punish D for committing C. On any form 
of retributivism, retributive reasons are (at least) relevant to whether punishing D is 
justified.7 And, retributive reasons have a characteristic form: ?[D] deserves X in virtue of 
F, ?where [D] is a person, X is a mode of treatment, and F [is] some fact about [D].?8 If X 
is legally-imposed hard treatment, death, censure, or the like, then F must be a fact about 
something D voluntarily did.9
Placing justificatory weight on retributive reasons is consistent with different forms 
of retributivism, some of which are very modest. According to some, ?just punishment [is] 
one good among many, and one that can be outweighed by other goods that punishing the 
deserving puts at risk.?10 Retributivis??? ?????? ????? ?????? ????? ????????? ?????? principal
overall objective is preventing social harm, instead of assuring that people get (or get no 
more than) their just deserts.11 Regardless of how modest the form of retributivism, the 
desert subject must be a moral agent, D, who performs an action that is the desert basis. 
Only a moral agent could deserve or not deserve punishment. And the action that is the 
desert basis can be referred to as a ?wrongdoing.?12 Finally, if there are no retributive facts, 
then no form of retributivism, however modest, is true.  
                                                          
 6. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????assuming that there are any retributive 
reasons. The definition clarifies what such a thing would be if there were any. Sometimes, I will interchangeably 
????????????????????????????????
 7. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . awards [retributivism] 
only a peripheral role in his rationale for . . ????????????????????????????????????, Broad Culpability and the 
Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 450 (2012). 
 8. JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970). 
 9. This article does not adopt any position about what, specifically, D should get when D gets what D 
deserves. This article brackets omissions liability and focuses on criminal liability for voluntary action. 
 10. L. ALEXANDER & K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 8??????????? ????????????????????????????????????
retributivist finds room for consequentialist considerations . . . somewhere in his account. . . . [T]o count as 
retributive . . . [a theory] need only regard desert and blame as central to attempts to provide answers to normative 
questions about . . ??????????????????????supra note 7, at 450 n.4. 
11. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????both
that the General Justifying Aim of . . . punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of the 
General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference to [retributive] principles of Distribution.??HART,
supra note 3 at 5. 
 12. ??????????????????????????????????????????morally or ethically bad or wrong, remaining neutral about 
what the moral badness/wrongness of a morally bad/wrong action amounts to. This paper considers punishment 
for malum in se offences only. In different contexts, one could refer to the commission of a malum prohibitum
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
are wrongs only because criminally illegal. I am ignoring such complications. 
3
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III.  RETRIBUTIVISM, CONTROL, AND A PUZZLE ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
For a retributive fact about D to exist, D must deserve punishment for some 
wrongdoing that D performs. Such desert requires D to be morally responsible for that 
wrongdoing. ?? ????????????? ??? ?????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ???????
responsible for performing it. ???? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ????? ??? ?? ??? ????????
responsible for performing it.13 Further: 
When we hold [D] [morally] responsible for acting wrongly, [D] is not the same as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. Because our blame and 
punishment are directed at the agent [D] but are justified (if they are) by the wrong-
making features of what [D] has done, their grounding must include some 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????-making features.14
Arguably, for D to be related in the right way to the wrong-???????????????????????
blameworthy actions two conditions must be satisfied: (1) D must have sufficient control 
over what D does, and (2) D must have sufficient knowledge about what D does, including 
the context in which D acts. We can refer to (1) as a voluntariness condition and (2) as an 
epistemic condition.15 I will assume that, for a retributive justificatory ?grounding? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-making features 
must accommodate both the voluntariness condition and the epistemic condition. The 
focus going forward, however, will be the voluntariness condition.16
Retributive facts about D exist only if D performs blameworthy actions. Restricting 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
action is blameworthy if D ?commit[s] the actus reus of [the] offense with [any] morally 
blameworthy state of mind.?17 However, ?[m]any aspects of blame are not matters of mens 
rea. . . . [Some] . . . involve actus reus.?18 ???? ???????????????? ??? ???? ???????????
depends on factors other than the sorts of mental states that D had, or should have had, 
when D acted. The ?conduct? element of any actus reus features a voluntary act. This 
?voluntary act ?????????????(VAR) requires that D have the right sort of control over what 
D does when D does it.19 And, insofar as the VAR is to be justified along retributivist lines, 
                                                          
 13. Moral responsibility is a necessary condition for praiseworthy actions as well. D can be morally 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
responsible for doing it. 
 14. GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? 147 (2009). 
15. See id. (employing this terminology). This dual requirement for moral responsibility has been expressed 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pardon and sometimes pity too. . . . Actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed under 
??????????????????????????????????Id. at 3 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????MICHAEL 
S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 403 (1997). 
 16. In the remainder of this article, for any action discussed for which an agent might be morally responsible, 
I will assume that the epistemic condition is satisfied. Going forward, moral responsibility turns on whether the 
voluntariness condition is satisfied. 
 17. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 118 (6th ed. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 18. Husak, supra note 7, at 458. 
 19. ????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which 
4
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for D to deserve punishment for doing something, D must exercise the right kind of control
when D does it. 
In sum: (a) retributivism requires the existence of retributive facts about D; (b) the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???? ???????????? ????????? ???? ???? ???? ???????????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???
exercise the ?right ??????of control when D acts. Thus, serious doubts about whether D has 
the ?right ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
The longstanding debates about determinism and free will have raised such doubts, 
and so, the next section will engage some of those debates. To set the stage, this section 
concludes with a major assumption, some brief definitions, and a puzzle.  
First, the assumption: ??????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ????
caused (in the right way) by? D20 ???????? ???????????? ???????21 To get an idea of what 
causation ?in the right ????? is, consider a ?????????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ??? ????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a 
rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the 
weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his 
hold.22
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the loosening of his hold to make the hold-?????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????????
actions. ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????? intentional 
explanation. ?Intentional explanations explain a bit of behavior . . . by making it 
reasonable in the light of certain beliefs, intentions, [and] desires . . . [of] the agent.?23 If, 
instead, the climber voluntarily let go to save himself, then the hold-loosening would have 
an accurate intentional explanation, based on the ?right ??????of causation. In that case, the 
?????????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ??
manner that made the hold-loosening reasonable in virtue of the contents of the causally 
operative intentional states.24
                                                          
???????????????????????????MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018). The American Law Institute 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . focuses upon conduct that is within the control of 
?????????????Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
20. If there were no defensib??????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????????????????????????then this 
????????????????????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??????? ???????????? ???????? ??????? ????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????uses in Part V. 
 21. Peter A. Graham, The Standard Argument for Blame Incompatibilism, 42 NOÛS 697, 703 (2008). 
 22. DONALD DAVIDSON, Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 63, 79 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1980). 
 23. DANIEL C. DENNETT, Mechanism and Responsibility, in BRAINSTORMS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON 
MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
role (in the sense of efficient causation) that makes an intentional explanation ????????????????????????really has
those intentional states, independently ??? ?????????????? ????????? ??????????????? ???????? ???????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????because D really has those intentional states. 
 24. It bears reemphasis that all of this is part of a major assumption about what a voluntary action is. 
?????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ??? not part of the 
5
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Turning to the definitions: Free will is ?the unique ability of persons to exercise 
control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility.?25
?Determinism is the thesis that the past and the laws of nature together determine, at every 
moment, a unique future?? ?? ?? ??26 Indetermin???? ?is the denial of determinism.?27
Compatibilism is the thesis that it is possible both that determinism be true and that D have 
free will.28 Incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism.29
With the assumption and definitions on the table, consider a puzzle about moral 
responsibility (PMR): Moral responsibility for blameworthy action seems to be 
incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism.30 Moral responsibility for 
blameworthy action seems, therefore, to be impossible. But sometimes agents seem to be 
morally responsible for performing blameworthy actions. The impossible therefore seems 
to exist.31
A solution to PMR would resolve the seeming contradiction. And, for such a solution 
to accommodate retributive facts, the solution must accommodate D???????????????right 
?????? of control needed to be morally responsible for performing a blameworthy 
wrongdoing.  
IV. DETERMINISM, CONTROL, AND ??LTIMATE?MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
For PMR to threaten retributivism, there must be prima facie reasons to think that 
???? ????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ???? ???? ?????? ??????????????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ???
incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, as per hard incompatibilism. On 
one conception of the control that D must have to be morally responsible for committing 
                                                          
assumption that reasons themselves stand in causal relations to states and events. The things that stand in such 
relations under the assumption are intentional states, whose contents are reasons. 
 25. Michael McKenna & D. Justin Coates, Compatibilism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last modified 
Feb. 25, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. I am adopting this definition by stipulation. So, 
I am not assuming that D has this ability. The definition, as far as it goes, states an ability that D would have if D 
had free will. 
 26. Peter van Inwagen, How to Think about the Problem of Free Will, 12 J. ETHICS 327, 330 (2008). More 
precisely, determinism is true if and only if the set of the actual laws of nature is deterministic?? ??????????????????
laws of nature is deterministic just in case there is one, and only one, distinct possible world for each initial state 
of the world compossible with that set of laws. . . . So, if the [set of laws of nature of the] actual world is 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????supra note 21, at 701.  
 27. Inwagen, supra note 26, at 330. 
 28. The possibility here is metaphysical: Compatibilism is the thesis that there are possible worlds in which 
determinism is true and D has free will. Compatibilists could consistently deny both that determinism is true and 
that D has free will. Soft determinists are compatibilists who think that determinism is true and D has free will. 
 29. Since incompatibilists think that there is no possible world in which determinism is true and D has free 
?????? ???????????????????????????? ???? ????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????????????? hard 
incompatibilist is ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Coates, supra note 25. In other words, a hard incompatibilist thinks that free will is consistent with neither
determinism nor indeterminism and is, therefore, metaphysically impossible. 
 30. Note that I am not endorsing every step of PMR as compelling. PMR serves to frame subsequent 
discussion. 
 31. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. Free will seems, therefore, to be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Free 
Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 11 (2000). 
6
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a crime, C, at t, D must, at t, be able not to commit C. The Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities captures this conception: ?[A] person is morally responsible for what he has 
done only if he could have done otherwise.?32
Harry Frankfurt poses a counterexample to this principle: 
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. ?????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????? ?????? ???
shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned 
that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, 
if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the 
resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will 
shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for 
his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, 
or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never 
intervened.33
In the counterexample, Jones seems morally responsible for shooting Smith, even 
though Jones could not have done otherwise when he pulls the trigger.  
As John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza might say, Jones has ?guidance ?????????
but lacks ?regulative ????????:
[S]uppose that Sally is driving her car. . . . Sally wishes to make a right turn. As a result of 
her intention to turn right, she . . . carefully guides the car to the right. Further . . . assume 
that Sally was able to form the intention not to turn the car to the right but to turn the car to 
the left instead . . . [and] that, had she formed such an intention, she would have turned the 
steering wheel to the left and the car would have gone to the left. . . . Sally guides the car to 
the right, but she could have guided it to the left. She controls the car, and . . . she has a 
??????????????????????????????????????? ????????. Insofar as Sally [] guides the car in a certain 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e power to guide 
the car in a different way . . ???????????????????????????????34
?????????? ??? ???????????? ???????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ?????????
possesses guidance control, and seems morally responsible for shooting Smith, the sort of 
control necessary for moral responsibility appears to be some form of guidance control. 
Whether this appearance is correct turns, in part, on what being ?truly? morally responsible 
for a criminal wrongdoing requires. On one view, the sort of ?true? moral responsibility 
necessary for punitive desert is ultimate responsibility. D is ultimately responsible for a 
wrongdoing if D ?[is], or [is] responsible for, the ultimate (determining) ???????????????
wrongdoing], having ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????all 
the way back.?35
The ?Consequence Argument,? which shows that, if determinism is true, then D is 
not ultimately responsible for any wrongdoings, helps clarify what ?all the way ??????
                                                          
 32. Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829, 829 (1969).  
 33. McKenna & Coates, supra note 25 ???????????????????????????????????mple from Alternate Possibilities 
and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829 (1969)). 
 34. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 30?31 (1998). 
 35. K.E. BOXER, RETHINKING RESPONSIBILITY 14 (2013). I a???????????????? ?????????????????????????????
Therefore, I am not assuming that D is ultimately responsible for anything. 
7
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amounts to. First, a pithy version of the Consequence Argument:  
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and 
events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, 
and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences 
of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.36
A recent formalisation of the Consequence Argument by Brian Cutter more 
?????????????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??????37 ????????? ???malisation requires some 
apparatus. In addition to the standard inference rules of modal and propositional logic, we 
need, first, an operator, ???: Np =df p, and every agent S is such that, for anything S can 
do, if S were to do it, it would still be the case that p. Second, we need two inference rules 
involving N, where ????is the standard modal operator for broadly logical necessity:  
???? p ? Np
??????p ? q), Np ? Nq.38
Third, let P0 be a comp?ete specification of the world at some moment, t0, before the 
existence of any human beings. Fourth, let L be the conjunction of all the laws of nature. 
And fifth, let P be a true proposition about some arbitrary thing that happens after t0.
(1)? ((P0 & L) ? P)              [premise ? determinism] 
(2)? (P0 ? (L ? P))              [from 1, standard modal and propositional logic] 
(3) N(P0 ? (L ? P))              ?????????????
(4) NP0                                  [premise] 
(5) N(L ? P)                          ????????????????
(6) NL                                    [premise] 
(7) NP                                    ????????????????
Letting P be the proposition that D commits C at t (obviously, later than t0), the 
Consequence Argument shows that, for anything D can do, if D were to do it, it would still 
be the case that D commits C at t. ?All the way back? in the definition of ?ultimate 
responsibility? can be understood in reference to t0. The Consequence Argument shows 
that D cannot personally determine the (determining) causes of (D?s) actions because those 
determining causes are ?fully operative? at t0, before D, personally, could cause or 
determine anything. 
Thus, if determinism is true, then, D is not ultimately responsible for committing C. 
So, if moral responsibility for committing C requires ultimate responsibility for 
committing C, then ???????????? ????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????
even if D exercises guidance control in committing C. Hence, if ultimate responsibility is 
required for ?true? moral responsibility, then determinism forecloses the existence of any 
retributive facts about D. This raises a crucial question: Does ?true? moral responsibility 
require ultimate moral responsibility?  
A compatibilist might argue that ultimate responsibility is not required for moral 
responsibility. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 36. PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL v (1983). 
37. See Brian Cutter, What is the Consequence Argument an Argument for?, 77 ANALYSIS 278, 280 (2017). 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????VAN INWAGEN, supra note 36. 
38. See VAN INWAGEN, supra note 36, at 94. 
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shooting Smith when Black does not intervene. ??????????????????????????????????????????
moral-responsibility-??????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ???????? ??????a
mechanism that operates unencumbered by ?outside? or ?external? interference. ???????????
exercise of such a mechanism?the unhampered, properly-functioning exercise of which 
???????????? ???????? ????????? ??? ????????? ??????? is sufficient for Jones to be morally 
responsible for shooting Smith, then Jones is morally responsible for shooting Smith, even 
if determinism is true and Jones lacks ultimate responsibility for shooting Smith.39 The 
compatibilist could then elaborate the sort of guidance control mechanism that Jones 
??????????????????????????????????????true? moral responsibility for his voluntary actions.40
Indeed, if the Consequence Argument is sound, then it seems that a compatibilist must
deny that: (i) ?true? moral responsibility requires ultimate responsibility and (ii) ?true?
moral responsibility requires regulative control, not just guidance control. In this way, 
compatibilists avoid the foreclosure of retributivism by determinism and could, 
consistently, endorse both determinism and retributivism.41
Settling whether true moral responsibility requires ultimate responsibility, regulative 
control, or both exceeds this article??? ?????.42 This section has argued that, on that 
assumption, determinism forecloses retributivism. In the next section (focusing on 
indeterminism), I will assume ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
punishment for committing C to consider the implications of that assumption if 
indeterminism is true. 
V. INDETERMINISM, CONTROL, AND AGENT CAUSATION
A.  Control and the “Disappearing Agent” Objection 
??????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
the Consequence Argument provides prima facie ???????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ??????
responsibility for blameworthy action is incompatible with determinism. But what about 
indeterminism? For PMR to threaten retributivism, there must also be prima facie reasons 
??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????? ??????????????? ??? ????????????? ????? ??????????????43 For the 
remainder of this section, I will assume, for the sake of argument, that indeterminism is 
true.  
Why might ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mmitting C at t 
                                                          
 39. ???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????also 
must be responsive to practical reasons available to Jones. 
 40. Fischer and Ravizza develop this tack. See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY 
AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998). 
 41. As previously explained, a compatibilist could be an indeterminist. But the main point here is that even a 
soft determinist could be a retributivist if moral responsibility does not require ultimate responsibility. 
 42. I am inclined to think that ultimate responsibility is ????????????????? true moral responsibility but that 
regulative control is not required. It is because I think that ultimate responsibility is required that I am an 
incompatibilist. But, plausibly defending incompatibilism by defending the necessity of ultimate responsibility 
exceeds what I can do in this article. This article, therefore, offers no argument against compatibilists who solve 
PMR by denying that ultimate responsibility is required for true moral responsibility. 
43. Part of my formulation of PMR is that moral responsibility for blameworthy action seems to be 
incompatible with indeterminism. 
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through the exercise of control is incompatible with indeterminism? If, in addition to 
indeterminism, the ?Luck Principle? is true, then ??????????????????????????????????????????
ruled out. According to the Luck Principle: ?If an action is undetermined at a time t, then 
it?s happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so 
it could not be a free and responsible action.?44 ?????????????????????????????????????????
desert would be precluded if nothing, including anything about D, determines, or controls, 
????????????????
[W]here [actions] proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. . . . [T]he person is not responsible for [the actions] 
. . . [A]s [they] proceeded from nothing in him . . . tis impossible he can, upon [their] account, 
become the object of punishment or vengeance.45
To solve PMR, the incompatibilist could deny the Luck Principle and coherently 
explain how, when D commits crime C at t, D could46 exercise control in committing C, 
such that:  
D is ultimately responsible for committing C at t,  
???????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exercise of the necessary sort of control, ability, or power. 
A challenge to the possibility of such an explanation could be derived from Derk 
????????????Disappearing Agent Objection.?47 Imagine that D is deciding, a little before 
and up to time t, whether to commit crime C.D is motivated, a little before and up to t, by 
moral reasons, not to commit C, but D is also motivated, a little before and up to t, by 
narrowly self-interested reasons, to commit C. ???? ???????????? ???? ????????????? ?-
involving states or events that causally affect how D behaves at t. Further, imagine that 
                                                          
 44. Robert Kane, Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, 96 J. PHIL.
217, 217 (1999) (emphases removed). 
 45. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. II, pt. III, § II. Robert Kane elaborates this idea: 
?Suppose two agents had exactly the same pasts . . . up to the point where they were faced with a choice between 
distorting the truth for selfish gain or telling the truth at great personal cost. One agent lies and the other tells the 
truth. . . . [Such] undetermined choices or actions would be ?arbitrary,? ?capricious,? ?random,? ?uncontrolled,?
?irrational,? ?inexplicable,? or ?matters of luck or chance,? and hence not free and responsible actions.? Kane, 
supra note 44, at 222????? ??? ?? ???????? ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ???????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
responsible for our actions. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 299 (1981). 
 46. To solve PMR, the incompatibilist must show only that incompatibilism is consistent with ultimate 
responsibility. In other words, the incompatibilist must argue only that there are possible worlds in which 
indeterminism is true and D is ultimately responsible. Coherently explaining such a possibility establishes 
consistency. Solving PMR this way, however, does not establish a libertarian position, according to which there 
actually are retributive facts about morally responsible agents. In other words, even if the incompatibilist solution 
to PMR works, all forms of retributivism might, in fact, be false. 
47. See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, AND MEANING IN LIFE 32 (2014). Pereboom himself 
thinks that the incompatibilist explanation to be considered shortly, based on agent-causalism, is coherent but is 
not likely ??? ??? ?????? ?????????? ? . . agent-causes . . . involves no internal incoherence. There is no internal 
incoherence in the idea of an agent having a . . . causal power to cause her actions deliberately in such a way that 
her causation of her actions is not itself produced by processes beyond her control. It is unclear, however, whether 
we have any reason to believe that such ent?????????????????????????????Determinism al Dente, 29 NOÛS 21, 28 
(1995). 
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these D-involving states or events do not causally necessitate ????????????. As explained 
previously, according to determinism, the laws of nature are deterministic.48 According to 
indeterminism, however, some laws of nature are not deterministic. Some are 
probabilistic.49
Consistent with the working indeterministic assumption of probabilistic natural 
laws, imagine that the D-involving states or events make p the probability that D commits 
C at t and (1 ? p) the probability that D does not commit C at t.50 Next, imagine that D 
commits C at t. Although the D-involving states or events occurring before t give D???
committing C at t a probability of p, nothing makes it the case that D commits C at t, as 
opposed to not committing C at t. Within the scope of the probabilities, what happens at t 
is random. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mmitting C at t. 
The agent, D, has ?disappeared.? ???? ?disappearance? at t threatens to preclude any 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????chance
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of the necessary sort of 
control. How might the incompatibilist meet this challenge?  
B.  Agent Causalism 
The incompatibilist might embrace agent causalism to meet the challenge. To clarify 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????It Ain?t Me Argument?:
(1) An agent s self-determines a decision d only if (i) s adjudicates between his 
various motivations for or against d, and (ii) on the basis of this adjudicating 
process s determines or causes d. 
(2) If the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles of (i) and 
(ii), then s plays the causal roles of (i) and (ii) only if s is identical to (some 
members of) this set of states and events. 
(3) An agent is not identical to any state or event or any set of states and events. 
(4) Therefore, if the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles 
of (i) and (ii), then s does not self-determine d. 
(5) Therefore, if s self-determines d, then s, and not merely states and events, 
causes d.51
The incompatibilist could respond to the challenge posed by the Disappearing Agent 
Objection by endorsing step three and accepting agent causalism, according to which the 
agent, D, is a substance having a set of choice-enabling properties in virtue of which D 
has a certain power, which ?is not characterized by any function from circumstances to 
effects.?52 The choice-enabling properties ?make possible the direct, purposive bringing 
                                                          
48. See infra n. 26. 
 49. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ????? ???????? ?? ???????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??????? Law of nature, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/law-of-nature#ref285134 (last modified Mar. 20, 2014).  
 50. The intended interpretation of probability here is non-subjective. 
 51. Christopher Evan Franklin, If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-
Causalist, 125 MIND 1101, 1120?21 (2016). 
 52. ??????????????????Why Agent Causation?, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 143, 145 (1996). 
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about of an effect by [D].?53 ?Substance? here expresses ?the concept of object, or thing 
when this is contrasted with properties or events.?54 Substances have properties and are 
involved in events. Imagine that D eats a carrot named ?Harvey.? Harvey is a substance.55
Orangeness and edibility are two properties that Harvey has. ???????????????????????????
event that involves two substances?Harvey and D. D is not a property or an event. D has 
the property of having a mouth, and so on.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or events, and hence, the only kind of basic causal relation is one whose relata are states 
or events.56 In contrast, according to agent causalism, although all effects are states or 
events, some causes are substances. There is an irreducible type of causal relation, in which 
D, a substance, causes a state or event. According to agent causalism, 
causation by [D] is causation by such a substance. Since a substance is not the kind of thing 
that can itself be an effect (though various events involving it can be) . . . [D] is in a strict 
???? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?????? [blameworthy] decisions, an uncaused cause of 
them.57
The idea of this second, irreducible type of causal relation?substance-causation?
is old.58 According to Roderick Chisholm, Aristotle alludes to the two different types of 
causal relation when Aristotle states: ?[a] staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, 
which is moved by a man.?59 Agent causalism depicts D as able to act in a kind of 
autonomous, self-determining way. Such causal autonomy requires that D have an 
?originating? ???????????????????????????????. Having this sort of control, in turn, requires 
that D be a substance that can agent-cause certain events. Thus, according to agent 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ????n agent is not identical to any 
state or event or any set of states and events??is true.  
What would asserting that D is identical to a (set of) state(s) or a (set of) events 
amount to? We should keep retributive theories of punishment in mind when answering 
this question. When D is morally responsible for committing C, it is D, if anyone, who 
                                                          
 53. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 54. Howard Robinson, Substance, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last modified Feb. 3, 2014), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/. 
 55. In asserting that Harvey is a substance, I am bracketing potential metaphysical issues pertaining to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????i.e. objects with proper material 
????????????????????????????One’s a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism, 55 
ANALYTIC PHIL. 199, 199 (2014). I am ignoring any possible complications involved, for example, in holding 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-wise. 
 56. ????????????-causalist [contends] that the causation of events intrinsic to . . . [blameworthy] actions by 
[D] . . ???????????? ?????????????????????????-??????????????????????????Agent-causation, 92 MIND 61, 63 (1983). 
 57. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (rev. ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ (emphasis 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 58. There might be a single type of irreducible causal relation such that some relata are of a different 
metaphysical category (substances) than others (events). Maybe, whether an event or a substance does the causing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????-a???????????????????????????????????????
 59. Roderick M. Chisholm, Freedom and Action, in FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM 11?44 (Keith Lehrer, ed. 
1966) (quoting ARISTOTLE, Physics, 256a). I remain neutral as to whether Aristotle intended this statement to 
illustrate the two types of causation under discussion. The point is simply that the idea of substance causation is 
an old one, possibly ancient. 
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deserves punishment for committing C.60 What is the relationship between D and the 
wrong-??????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ???????? ?? ??????-based justification for 
punishing D, not someone else, for performing that action? Asserting that D is identical 
to a set of states or events implies a ?Bundle Theory? of personal agents, such as D. 
According to the Bundle Theory, D just is a complex event comprising experiences, 
intentional events, and so forth. During any time-??????????????????????????????????????
does not ?entirely exist??only the part of D that is currently ?happening? does: ??here are 
long series of different mental states and events. . . . Each series is unified by various kinds 
of causal relation. . . . [A] Bundle Theorist denies the existence of persons. . . . If . . . 
persons are . . . separately existing things, distinct from . . . various kinds of mental states 
and events.?61
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????not identical to any state or event 
or any set of states and events entails that the Bundle Theory is false. And, it seems that 
the incompatibilist must deny the Bundle Theory to prevent the Disappearing Agent 
Objection from precluding any explanation of how D exercises control in committing C at 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????sort of control, ability, or power.  
??????? ????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?? ????????? ?????????????
motivations are intentional, D-involving states or events that causally affect, without 
??????????????? ???? ??????????? ?? ??? ?. On the Bundle ???????? ???? ???????????? ????D-
involving intentional events in virtue of being proper spatiotemporal parts of D?the big 
event that D is includes them. The Bundle Theory elaborates the relationship between D 
and the wrong-making features of C that grounds a desert-based justification for punishing 
D for C as follows: C has wrong-making features. ????????????????????????? ??? ??????????.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other agent. D is, therefore, uniquely related to the wrong-making features of C because it 
is intentional events that D, and no other agent, spatiotemporally comprises that ?partially?
cause, without necessitating, C at t.  
Now, rehearse the Disappearing Agent Objection once more: Consistent with the 
assumption of indeterminism, imagine that the D-involving events (that D just is, or 
comprises) make p the probability that D commits C at t and that they make (1 ? p) the 
probability that D does not commit C at t.62 Next, imagine that D commits C at t. Although 
the series of D-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
committing C at t a probability of p, nothing else?indeed, nothing at all?makes it the 
case that D commits C at t, as opposed to not committing C at t. Within the scope of the 
probabilities, what happens at t is random. It is neither D nor anything about D that brings 
?????? ???? ??????????? ?? ??? ?. The agent, D, has ?disappeared.? If D just is or 
spatiotemporally comprises a set of D-involving intentional events governed by 
probabilistic natural laws?and nothing more?then all that D or any spatiotemporal part 
                                                          
 60. To simplify, I am ignoring the possibility of desert-based complicity liability here. 
 61. DEREK PARFIT, Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons, in MINDWAVES: THOUGHTS ON 
INTELLIGENCE, IDENTITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 19?26 (1987). 
 62. The intended interpretation of probability here is non-subjective. 
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of D could do is ?control? the probabilities. Within the scope of those probabilities, what 
happens would be random. The Bundle Theory invites the Luck Principle problems back 
into the picture.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
just is a very complex event consisting of a set or series of causally necessitated and/or 
probabilistically randomized mental events?some of which form whatever chains of 
?????????? ?????????? ???????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????? ?????????? ???????? ????
actions?then it is hard to see how D could satisfy the voluntariness condition for moral 
responsibility, given the assumption that moral responsibility requires ultimate 
responsibility. D could not ?control? ???? ???????? ???? ???????? ??? ??????? ???????????
responsible for them any more than a hurricane could ?control? how it behaves to become 
ultimately responsible for its behaviour.  
Thus, an incompatibilist aiming to solve PMR should accept that D is not identical 
to a series of states or events. To be the sort of thing that could exercise the necessary sort 
of control, ability, or power at t such that ???????????????????????????????????randomly
(within probabilities), D must be a substance that can cause C at t without being determined 
to do so. D must be a substance capable of exercising agent-causal control at t. It is by 
exercising agent-causal power in bringing about C at t that D becomes morally responsible 
for committing C.63
If agent causalism is coherent, and therefore possible, the incompatibilist can solve 
PMR by offering a strong prima facie ??????? ???? ???? ????????? ??????????????? ????
blameworthy action is compatible with indeterminism.64 The incompatibilist can argue 
that retributive facts about D are possible, ??????????????????????????????????????????????
ultimate responsibility.65 So, PMR is not an unresolvable puzzle about the existence of 
impossible things, even if ultimate responsibility is necessary for moral responsibility. 
There are possible worlds in which: (I) D is ultimately responsible for committing C at t, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????just a matter 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????agent-causal control. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????agent-causal? solution to PMR, 
it is worth examining the relationship between agent-causal control and the distinction 
between guidance control and regulative control. ??????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ????? ???????? ??????
??????????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????????????? ??? doing so. 
?????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ??????????????? ??? ???????????? ??????????????? ?????????? ???
which: (A) Jones lacks regulative control over shooting Smith, and (B) Jones is ultimately 
                                                          
 63. Some incompatibilists do not find agent causalism appealing. According to Robert Kane, incompatibilists 
who believe in free will sometimes:  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
immaterial egos, or nonoccurrent agent causes) to account for what would otherwise be arbitrary, 
uncontrolled, inexplicable, or mere luck or chance. . . . Such appeals introduce additional problems 
of their own without . . . directly confronting the deep problems about indeterminism, chance, and 
luck.  
Kane, supra note 44, at 223. 
 64. The possibility here is metaphysical. 
 65. The possibility here is metaphysical. 
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responsible for shooting Smith in virtue of exercising agent-causal guidance control.  
The agent causalist could accept (A) because Jones is unable to do otherwise than 
shoot Smith, even if indeterminism is true. The explanation of why Jones lacks regulative 
???????? ???????? ????? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ????????????? ???????.
?????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???????????????? ???? ??????????
counterfactual about Black is true: If Jones showed any signs that he would decide not to 
shoot Smith, then Black would intervene to override that decision by making Jones decide 
to shoot Smith. On the agent-causal, indeterministic interpretation, this true counterfactual 
is about how Black would exercise his agent-causal power to ?override? ?????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????. Because of Black, Jones cannot access or 
actualise any possible world in which he does not shoot Smith. As a matter of contingent
?????????????????????????????????????????if Jones tried to actualise such a possible world. 
The agent causalist could also accept (B). On the agent-causal, indeterministic 
interpretation, Jones is ultimately responsible for shooting Smith in virtue of exercising a 
form of guidance control. But, t??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
guidance control can be identical to the operation of a properly-functioning, reasons-
responsive, psychological mechanism. In addition, for exercising guidance control to 
confer ultimate responsibility upon Jones, his shooting Smith must ?hav[e] a causal history 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Jones must agent-
cause the shooting.66 By agent-causing the shooting, Jones originates it. By originating it, 
Jones himself is the ultimate determining cause of his shooting Smith. Jones himself is the 
??????????? ???????????? ?????? ?all the way back.? By exercising agent-causal guidance 
control, Jones is ultimately responsible for shooting Smith, even though Jones lacks 
regulative control over shooting Smith. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Retributive facts must exist for any form of retributivism to be true. In order for there 
to be retributive facts about D, D must be morally responsible for committing some crime, 
C. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
control in committing C in virtue of which D is ultimately responsible for committing C. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
determinism. And, even if determinism is false, Section V has argued that D must exercise 
agent-causal guidance control in committing C for D to be ultimately responsible for 
committing C. Therefore?If moral responsibility does not require ultimate responsibility, 
then both soft determinism and event-causal indeterminism are consistent with 
retributivism. But, on the assumption that ultimate responsibility is required for moral 
responsibility: (1) if determinism is true, then no retributive theory of punishment is true. 
And, (2) if agent causalism is false, then no retributive theory of punishment is true, even 
if determinism is false. 
                                                          
 66. See PEREBOOM, supra note 47. 
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